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ESTATE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE UNDER
§2042: RECENT DECISIONS DEFINING INCIDENTS
OF OWNERSHIP
The proceeds of life insurance policies are taxed to the insured's
gross estate under §2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954' if
the insured possessed at death any "incidents of ownership" 2 in the
policies. Although Congress has never defined the term "incidents of
ownership," '3 §2042(2) does state that the term includes an insured's
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2042(2) includes in a decedent's gross estate the
amount receivable by beneficiaries other than the executor
as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to
which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of
ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other
person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "incident of
ownership" includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the
express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law)
only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of
the value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent.
As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary interest" includes
a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return
to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary interest at any time shall be
determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's death) by
usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality
and actuarial principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate. In determining the value of a possibility that
the policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to a power of disposition
by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the decedent or his
estate.
Id. Section 2042(1) provides for the taxation to the gross estate of insurance
proceeds payable to the executor. Life insurance is taxed to a decedent's estate under
Code provisions in addition to §2042.*The testamentary transfer of policies on the lives
of persons other than the decedent may be taxed to the decedent's estate under INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §2033 (which includes the value of all property in which the
decedent had an interest). See, e.g., California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (discussing predecessor to §2033). The proceeds of life insurance
policies may also be taxed to the insured's estate under §2035 of the Code as a transfer
of property made in contemplation of death. In re Estate of Silverman, 521 F.2d 574
(2d Cir. 1975) (whole life insurance policy); Graves & Finley, Irrevocable Term Life
Insurance Trusts and Gifts in Contemplation of Death Under §2035, 32 WASH. & Lee
L. Rev. 855 (1975). In unusual circumstances, insurance policies may be taxable under
§2036 (taxing property transfers with retained life estate), §2038 (taxing incomplete
transfers of property), and §2041 (taxing certain powers of appointment) of the Code.
See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXEs §13.10 (3d
ed. 1974) and cases cited therein.
Committee reports under the Revenue Act of 1942, however, did contain an

776

1976]

INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP

reversionary interest worth more than five per cent of the value of the
policy immediately before his death.4 Other examples of incidents of
ownership are set out in Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1(c)(2),5
which states that the term generally refers to the right of the insured
to the economic benefits of the policy. Thus, the power of the insured
to change the beneficiary, to surrender, cancel or assign the policy,
to borrow against the cash value of the policy, or to pledge the policy
as security for a loan have been all recognized as incidents of ownership.'
While there is little doubt that taxpayers may continue to rely on
these examples of incidents of ownership, in recent years controversy
has arisen concerning the tax treatment of two types of interests in
life insurance policies that the insured cannot exercise for his own
benefit. One interest gives the decedent under a group term life insurance policy the ability to elect a settlement option of making either
large payments to the beneficiary for a short period of time, or smaller
payments for a more extended period. In the settlement option cases7
the decedent lacked the more usual incidents of ownership such as
the ability to select or change beneficiaries or to cancel the policy.8
The other type of interest subject to disagreement involves the conextensive discussion of the concept of incidents of ownership. See note 31 infra.
See note 1 supra.
Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7312, 1974-1 CUM. BULL.
277, 278, provides in pertinent part:
[flor purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of ownership"
is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical
legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of
the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. Thus,
it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel
the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the
policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the
surrender value of the policy, etc.
See note 5 supra. The Commissioner has attempted to treat the power of an
employee to cancel a group term life insurance policy by quitting his job as an incident
of ownership. Rev. Rul. 54, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 221, supersedingRev. Rul. 334, 1968-1
CuM. BULL. 403. See Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 853 (1950). The Court of Claims, in Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461
(Ct. Cl. 1969), held that power not to be an incident of ownership. In Rev. Rul. 307,
1972-1 CuM. BULL. 307, the Commissioner modified Rev. Rul. 54, ruling that the employee's power to cancel the group life insurance policy by quitting his job was not
an incident of ownership, but merely a collateral consequence of the termination of
employment.
7 Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C.
815 (1971); Estate of Connelly v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975).
See note 5 supra.

778

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

trol that an insured exercises over life insurance policies included in
the principal of a trust for which he is trustee.'
0
In Estate of Connelly v. United States,1
the United States District Court for New Jersey recently rejected contentions that such
interests were incidents of ownership, and attacked as unsound" contrary decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.2 Connelly is one of the latest decisions in an area that has
become increasingly divided, with the New Jersey district court joining determinations of the Second 3 and Sixth 4 Circuits against those
of the Fifth Circuit. 5 Although it now appears that only Supreme
Court decision" or congressional action can fully resolve the tax status of these interests, analysis of the various cases and the legislative
history suggests the non-taxable nature of the interests as incidents
of ownership.
The Sixth Circuit initiated the current controversy in Estate of
Fruehauf v. Commissioner17 by rejecting the Tax Court position that
powers over life insurance policies held by the insured as trustee
should be taxed as incidents of ownership under §2042(2)." Vera
Fruehauf was owner and beneficiary of six insurance policies on the
life of her husband Harry. When Vera died, her will directed that the
policies be assigned to a trust with her husband, designated coexecutor of her will, as co-trustee. The trustees were given the power
to make themselves beneficiaries or to surrender the policies for their
I Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'g 34 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 1 147,927 (M.D. Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976)
(No. 865); Rose v. United States. 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), affg 33 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 11147,878 (E.D. La. 1973); Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d
Cir. 1972), rev 'g 56 T.C. 1190 (1971); Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80
(6th Cir. 1970), aff'g on other grounds 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
398 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975).
Id. at 824, 827.
2 Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975); Estate of Lumpkin v.
Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
' Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
" Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
1 Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied., 44
U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976) (No. 865); Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259
(5th Cir. 1975); Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
" The Supreme Court, however, has denied certiorari in Terriberry v. United
States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Mar. 23,
1976) (No. 865).
17427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970), afl'g on other grounds 50 T.C. 915 (1968). Fruehauf
is discussed in Note, FederalEstate Taxation-Life Insurance Trusts, 49 N.C.L. REv.
539 (1971).
" Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915, 926 (1968).
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cash value.' 9 In addition to acting as co-executor and co-trustee,
Harry Fruehauf was also the life beneficiary of the trust. Fruehauf,
however, died before the administration of his wife's estate was completed, and the Commissioner determined that there was a deficiency
in his estate tax because Fruehauf's executors had failed to include
the six insurance policies in his gross estate.
In sustaining the Commissioner's position, the Tax Court drew an
analogy between §2042 and §2038,20 which includes incomplete transfers of property in a decedent's gross estate. The Tax Court reasoned
that both sections are part of the same tax scheme to include in the
gross estate the value of property over which the decedent held the
power to affect beneficial enjoyment. 2' Since §2038 expressly includes
property the enjoyment of which the decedent could affect without
regard to whether the power was exercised as a trustee or in a personal
capacity, the Tax Court concluded that the capacity in which Fruehauf exercised control over the insurance policies was immaterial.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed,2 but on different grounds. Under both
the terms of the will and state law, Fruehauf, without breaching his
fiduciary duty as trustee, could have surrendered the insurance policies for their cash value thereby increasing the trust corpus and his
income as life beneficiary of the trust. Since Fruehauf could exercise
control over the policies for his own benefit, the court of appeals held
that the proceeds of the insurance policies were properly includible
in his gross estate.23 The court, however, disagreed with the Tax
Court's rule that the insured's possession, solely in a trustee capacity,
of powers in the nature of incidents of ownership always requires
" The trustees additionally had the power to borrow against the cash value of the
policies and to convert any of the policies into fully paid policies in accordance with
the terms of the original policies. 427 F.2d at 82.
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2038(a)(1) includes in the decedent's estate the value
of all property:
[t]o the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust
or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of
his death to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever
capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in
conjunction with any other person (without regard to when or from
what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death.
21 50 T.C. at 926.
22

427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 86.
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inclusion of the proceeds.2 4 Unlike the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit
recognized a distinction between transfers under §2038, where the
decedent as transferor of the property retained the power to affect the
enjoyment of the property, and Fruehaufs situation under §2042,
where the decedent, in a trustee capacity, was the transferee.2 The
taxation of Fruehauf's powers as trustee under §2042 was also distinguished from §2038 treatment because his powers were not a substitute for a testamentary disposition by him. 28 Under the Fruehauf
decision, then, if an insured was the transferee of the insurance policies and exercised ownership solely in a trustee capacity, the policies
would not be taxed to his gross estate.
Two years after Fruehauf,similar questions confronted the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Estate of Skifter v.
Commissioner.Y Like the decedent in Fruehauf,decedent Skifter, as
trustee of a trust formed under his wife's will, possessed the power to
cancel insurance policies on his life that his wife had formerly
owned.? However, unlike Fruehauf, Skifter was unable to exercise his
powers as trustee to benefit himself. This, the Tax Court found,2
distinguished the case from Fruehauf. The Second Circuit affirmed.
After reviewing Regulation §20.2042-1(c)(2),3 derived from congressional committee reports 3' under the Revenue Act of 1942,32 the court
21 50 T.C. at 926.

11427 F.2d at 84. Neither the Tax Court nor the Sixth Circuit commented upon
the fact that §2038 as written draws no distinction between whether the decedent was
transferor or transferee of the power. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2038(a)(1), quoted
in note 20 supra.
21 427 F.2d at 84, citing Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 444 (1933). Neither
the Tax Court nor the Sixth Circuit decisions considered the effect of Treas. Reg.
§20.2042-1(c)(4) (1958), which would seem to have required the inclusion of the policies. See note 35 infra.
27 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.. 1972), rev'g 56 T.C. 1190 (1971). Skifter is discussed in
Comment, Estate Taxation of Life InsurancePolicies Held by the Insured as Trustee,
32 MD. L. REV. 305 (1972); 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1471 (1974); 39 Mo. L REV. 258 (1974);
48 NOrRE DAME LAW., 995 (1973).
21' Skifter, as trustee, had the power to terminate the trust in whole or part by
paying trust principal to the current income beneficiary. In addition, he was given
power to sell and mortgage the trust principal. 468 F.2d at 701.
20 Estate of Hector R. Skifter, 56 T.C. 1190, 1197 (1971). The Tax Court did not
rely on this ground alone, but proposed the rough parallel analysis, 56 T.C. at 1199,
which the Second Circuit adopted in its opinion. See text accompanying notes 36-53
infra.
30 Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958), quoted in note 5 supra.
31 H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942) states:
[tihere is no specific enumeration of incidents of ownership, the possession of which at death forms the basis for inclusion of insurance
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of appeals found special significance in the reference point of the
regulations: 33 the right of the insured to the economic benefits of the
policy.34 While Skifter as trustee had no right to the economic benefits
of the policy, the court did not rest its decision on that ground alone.
Treasury Regulation §20.2042-1(c)(4)5 seemingly would require inclusion of insurance policies in the estate of any insured who, as
trustee, had power to affect the enjoyment of the economic benefits
of the policies even if the insured had no beneficial interest in the
trust.36 The Second Circuit avoided possible conflict between Regulations §20.2042-1(c)(2) and §20.2042-1(c)(4) by inferring, from the
committee reports under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 31a congressional intent to give insurance policies estate tax treatment that
would roughly follow the treatment accorded other types of property
by other estate tax sections.38
proceeds in the gross estate, as it is impossible to include an exhaustive list. Examples of such incidents are the right of the insured or his
estate to the economic benefits of the insurance, the power to change
the beneficiary, the power to surrender or cancel the policy, the power
to assign it, the power to revoke an assignment, the power to pledge
the policy for a loan, or the power to obtain from the insurer a loan
against the surrender value of the policy. Incidents of ownership are
not confined to those possessed by the decedent in a technical legal
sense. For example, a power to change the beneficiary reserved to a
corporation of which the decedent is sole stockholder is an incident of
ownership in the decedent. A reversionary interest is not to be considered an incident of ownership in the case of a decedent dying after the
date of enactment of this act.
See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942), which contains essentially the
same language.
31 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §404, 56 Stat. 944, amending Int. Rev. Code of
1939, ch. 3, §811(g), 53 Stat. 122.
1 468 F.2d at 702.
1 Id. at 701-02, citing Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958), quoted in note 5 supra.
Treas. Reg. §2042-1(c)(4) (1958) provides in part:
[a] decedent is considered to have an "incident of ownership" in an
insurance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms of the
policy, the decedent (either alone or in conjunction with another person or persons) has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change the
beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no beneficial
interest in the trust.
56 T.C. at 1198.
S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954), reprintedat 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4757. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954),
reprintedat 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4117-18, which contains essentially the
same language as the Senate report.
u NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§2026-38, 2041. These estate tax sections are quoted
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Prior to the 1954 Code, insurance proceeds were taxed to the decedent's gross estate if he possessed incidents of ownership or if he paid
the premiums on the policy." In explaining the decision to eliminate
the premium payments test in the 1954 Code, the Senate Finance
Committee stated:
[n]o other property is subject to estate taxation where the
decedent initially purchased it and then long before his death
gave away all rights to the property and to discriminate
against life insurance in this regard is not justified. 0
From this report, the Second Circuit drew a "very strong" inference
that Congress intended §2042 to operate in a manner that "roughly
parallels" related tax sections.' Thus, according to the Skifter court,
the tax treatment of non-insurance property under §§2036,42 2037,11
2038,11 and 204111 is determinative of the tax treatment of insurance
in note 20 supra and notes 42-45 infra.
11 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §404, 56 Stat. 944, amending Int. Rev. Code of
1939, ch. 3, §811(g), 53 Stat. 122.
I" S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954), reprinted at 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4117-18.
468 F.2d at 702.
TNT.
I
REV. CODE OF 1954, §2036(a) includes in a decedent's gross estate:
the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life
or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or
for any period which does not in fact end before his death(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom.
I2
INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §2037, includes the value of all property that the
decedent has transferred for less than adequate consideration, when enjoyment of the
property can be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and the decedent retained a
reversionary interest in the property worth more than five per cent of the value of the
property immediately before the decedent's death. The value of the decedent's interest
is determined from actuarial tables promulgated by the Commissioner. See Treas. Reg.
§§20.2037-1(c)-(e), 20.2031-1, 20.2031-7 and 20.2031-9. Property subject to the exercise
of a general power of appointment (as defined by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2041, see
note 45 infra) held by a person other than the decedent is not included under §2037 if
the power was exercisable immediately before the decedent's death.
" See note 20 supra.
IINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2041. Under §2041 the gross estate includes the value
of all property over which the decedent held a general power of appointment. With
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policies under §2042. An interest that would cause property to be
taxed under these related tax sections would by analogy constitute
an incident of ownership if it applied to insurance policies. The court
found further support for its inference in Congress' decision to treat
the possession of a reversionary interest worth more than five per cent
of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent as an incident of ownership," treatment that was similar to that
accorded other types of property under §2037."7
In response to the Second Circuit's "rough parallel" analysis, the
Commissioner contended that since Skifter possessed a power to
alter, amend, or terminate the trust,48 §2038 acting through §2042
would cause the insurance policies to be included in Skifter's gross
estate. 9 The Commissioner also argued that Regulation §20.20421(c)(4)5 required the policies to be taxed to Skifter's gross estate. The
court of appeals, however, held that Regulation §20.2042-1(c)(4) did
not reach Skifter's powers as trustee, and rejected the Commissioner's contention that §2038 was applicable. While the Commissioner cited two Supreme Court cases 5' in support of his rough parallel argument, the Second Circuit noted that these cases were distincertain exceptions, §2041(b)(1) defines a general power of appointment as "a power
which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors
of his estate." Since §2041 applies only to general powers of appointment, all other
powers of appointment are special powers which are not subject to estate taxation
under §2041.
11"To place insurance policies in an analogous position to other property, however, it is necessary to make the 5-percent reversionary interest rule, applicable to
other property [under §20371, also applicable to life insurance." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954); see note 43 supra.
11See note 43 supra. Somewhat inexplicably, the Second Circuit also found support for its analysis in the examples of incidents of ownership that Congress listed in
its committee reports because these were interests "that would cause other types of
property to be included in a decedent's estate under" §§2036-38 and §2041. 468 F.2d
at 702. However, there were no examples of incidents of ownership listed in the 1954
committee reports. The court of appeals must have been referring instead to the examples set out in the 1942 committee reports. See note 5 supra.
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2038, quoted in note 20 supra.
468 F.2d at 702-03.
'

See note 35 supra.

s' United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966) (decedent transferred noninsurance property to a trust for which he was co-trustee; trust property was included
in his gross estate under the predecessor to §2036 because he had the power to change
beneficiaries by electing either to pay or accumulate trust income); Lober v. United
States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) (decedent transferred non-insurance property to trusts for
which he was trustee; trust property was included in his gross estate under the predecessor to §2038 because he retained the power to revoke the trust at any time by turning
the principal over to the beneficiaries).
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guishable. Both involved a power that the decedent had retained at
the time of the original transfer rather than, as in Skifter, a power
that was created by someone else and transferred to the decedent
after he had divested himself of all interest in the policies.2 In addition, unlike a §2038 analysis, Skifter's powers as trustee could not be
viewed as a substitute for testamentary disposition. Finally, the court
concluded that Regulation §20.2042-1(c)(4) applied only when the
decedent transferred the policies to the trust; then §2038, when read
into §2042, would operate to include the policies in the decedent's
gross estate. 3
54
In Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner,
the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially adopted the "rough parallel"
analysis of the Second Circuit but reached an inconsistent result. The
decedent in Lumpkin was not a trustee, rather his only interest was
the right to elect a settlement option under a group term life insurance policy. At the time of fiis death Lumpkin was covered by group
term life insurance for which his employer paid the premiums. Lumpkin had no power to direct that the proceeds of the policy by paid to
his estate, nor could he derive any economic benefits from the policy
or change the beneficiary.5 In fact, he possessed none of the examples
of incidents of ownership set out in the Treasury Regulations. 6 His
only power was an optional settlement provision that permitted him
to reduce the monthly benefits payable to his beneficiary thereby
extending the payments over a longer period of time than otherwise
possible.57
52 468 F.2d at 703-04.

Id. at 704-05. Section 2038 of the Code as written does not require that a decedent retain the power to alter or amend the enjoyment of the property before it will
be taxed. See note 20 supra. Since the only cases that had been found to include
property under §2038 involved interests reserved by the decedent as a transferor, the
Second Circuit read a requirement into §2038 that the decedent must have retained
the interest at the time of the original transfer. 468 F.2d at 704-05.
54474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973), vacating and remanding 56 T.C. 815 (1971). The
Lumpkin decision is discussed in Note, FederalEstate Tax-"Incidents of Ownership"
in Group Life Insurance,A PhraseSearching for Definition, 52 N.C.L. Rv. 671 (1974).
The group policy automatically provided for the payment of the proceeds to the
insured's spouse. If the spouse was dead, the proceeds would then be paid to other predetermined relatives of the insured. The settlement option, however, was applicable
only to the payment of proceeds to the spouse. Payments to other beneficiaries were
unalterable. 474 F.2d at 1093.
56 See Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958), quoted in note 5 supra.
s The portion of the benefits not immediately paid to the spouse would be accumulated with interest during the normal payment period of the benefits. When the
normal period expired, this additional fund would then be paid monthly to the spouse
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In ruling that the insurance proceeds were includible in Lumpkin's gross estate, the Fifth Circuit adopted without analysis"8 the
Second Circuit's conclusion in Skifter that Congress intended §2042
to give life insurance tax treatment roughly equivalent to that accorded other types of property. Relying upon the same Supreme
Court cases that had failed to persuade the Second Circuit, 9 the Fifth
Circuit determined that Lumpkin's power to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of the policy proceeds gave him a "substantial degree of control" that, if held over non-insurance property, would have
been taxable under §§2036 and 2038.9 In addition, according to the
court of appeals, Congress intended §2042 to include policies over
which the decedent possessed a significant amount of control."' Thus,
the control which Lumpkin exercised by analogy to §§2036 and 2038
required taxation of the proceeds of the policies under §2042. The
perceived congressional intent to grant life insurance tax treatment
parallel to that accorded other property would be violated if Lumpkin's power were not taxed under §2042.12 The Fifth Circuit, however,
until it was exhausted. If the spouse beneficiary died before the supplemental fund was
exhausted, the balance of the fund would be paid to the spouse's estate. 474 F.2d at
1093.
5' The Fifth Circuit merely stated "[tlhat Congress had such an intent with
respect to §2042 has been recognized in" Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d
699 (2d Cir. 1972). 474 F.2d at 1095 n.9.
11United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Lober v. United States, 346
U.S. 335 (1953). See note 51 supra.
&0474 F.2d at 1097. Contrary to the intimations of the Fifth Circuit, however, if
Lumpkin's right to alter the time and manner of enjoyment were held over noninsurance property, it would not have been taxable under §2036 and probably not
under §2038 either. Lumpkin did not retain the enjoyment of the insurance policy or
the right to designate the beneficiaries of the policy and §2036 clearly would not apply.
Additionally, since the insurance policy was owned and paid for by Lumpkin's employer, Lumpkin never. made any inter vivos transfer of property which could trigger
the provisions of §2036 or 2038. See text of §2036 quoted note 42 supra; text of §2038
quoted note 20 supra.
1, 474 F.2d at 1095. In support of its determination, the Fifth Circuit cited United
States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1966). The Rhode
Island case, however, nowhere uses the term "substantial control." The Rhode Island
court thought that Congress was attempting to reach the same types of power to
transfer property that the Supreme Court canvassed in Chase National Bank v. United
States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929). 355 F.2d at 10. Lumpkin's mere power to select a settlement option, however, would appear to be an interest of lesser magnitude than those
which the Supreme Court discussed in Chase. See notes 96 & 106 infra.
In Estate of Connelly v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975), the district
court cited the Rhode Island case in reaching a decision contrary to that in Lumpkin.
398 F. Supp. at 820, 828.
82

474 F.2d at 1097.
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rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion that insurance policies under
§2042 were always to be treated in the same manner as other property. The only significant distinction that the Fifth Circuit found
between §2038 and §2042 was that under the former section a decedent must have made an incomplete transfer of property, while under
the latter no transfer was necessary." Following the language of the
statutes, the Lumpkin court noted that under §2038 the decedent
must have retained an interest in the transferred property whereas
under §2042 it was sufficient if he merely possessed the interest.
Thus, the means by which the decedent came into possession of his
interest was irrelevant. 4
In Rose v. United States,6" the Fifth Circuit applied the Lumpkin
decision to reach a result irreconcilable with those of the Sixth Circuit
in Fruehauf and the Second Circuit in Skifter. Like the decedents in
Fruehauf and Skifter, the decedent in Rose possessed as trustee the
power to cancel insurance policies on his life.66 As in Skifter, the
decedent in Rose also possessed no beneficial interest in the policies.
Relying on Lumpkin, and refusing to follow the other courts of appeals, the Fifth Circuit held that the proceeds of the insurance policies were includible in the decedent's gross estate under §2042. Appellant Rose argued that since the decedent as trustee was unable to
gain any economic benefit, the policies should not have been included
in his estate. However, the court noted that the decedent in Lumpkin
also was unable to benefit himself from the policies, yet the policies
3 Id.

11Id. The Fifth Circuit determined that Congress' intent in 1954 to read into the
concept of incidents of ownership property interests reached by §§2036-38 and 2041
effectively overruled May Billings, 35 B.T.A. 1147 (1937), acquiesced in, 1937-2 CUM.
BULL. 3, acquiescencewithdrawn and non-acquiescencesubstitued, 1972-1 CuM. BULL.
3. In that decision, the Board of Tax Appeals had determined that the mere right under
a Lumpkin-type settlement option to affect when the insurance proceeds would be paid
to the beneficiary was too insignificant to be an incident of ownership. Id. at 1152. See
474 F.2d at 1096-97. Although the Commissioner waited thirty-five years to withdraw
the acquiescence, and in fact only withdrew it after the litigation in Lumpkin had
already commenced, this had no legal effect. Id. at 1096 n.11, citing Dixon v. United
States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g 33 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 147,878 (E.D. La.
1973). Rose is discussed in 55 B.U.L. Rv. 864 (1975), and 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 621 (1975).
11The decedent as trustee additionally possessed the power to cancel or convert
the policies, and to borrow against their cash value. 511 F.2d at 261. The decedent in
Rose, unlike the decedents in Fruehauf or Skifter, never owned the policies in a personal capacity. The decedent's brother had established the trusts for the decedent's
children, and it was in his capacity as trustee that the decedent had purchased the
insurance policies. Id. at 260.
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were nevertheless included in his gross estate."1 The court further
found that the "substantial control" test applied in Lumpkin operated in Rose to include the proceeds of the insurance policies. In
addition, the Fifth Circuit held that Treasury Regulation §20.20421(c)(4), which the Second Circuit had read restrictively in Skifter,
required the same result." Again as in Lumpkin, the Rose court concluded that §2042 included insurance whenever the decedent possessed the property interest, while under other sections the concern
of Congress was whether the decedent retained any interest."
The United States District Court for New Jersey, in Estate of
Connelly v. United States,6 rejected the arguments that had been
successful in Lumphin and Rose. In Connelly, the Commissioner attempted to include in the decedent's gross estate proceeds payable
under the same group term life insurance policy provided by the same
employer as in Lumpkin. In holding for the taxpayer, the district
court classified Lumpkin as "not sound,"' and attacked the Rose
decision in dictum. 2 The court noted that settlement options such as
those in Connelly and Lumpkin had never been listed as an incident
of ownership in the Treasury Regulations. 3 Furthermore, the court
concluded that the failure of Congress to list such interests in the 1942
committee reports 4 from which the Treasury Regulations were
drawn 5 was intentional. 6
In addition to determining that Congress never intended the concept of incidents of ownership to include settlement options under
group term life insurance policies, the Connelly court also found the
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Lumpkin unpersuasive. While the
Commissioner again cited Supreme Court cases," the court found
these relatively easy to distinguish from the facts in Connelly."5 The
, 511 F.2d at 263.

Id. at 265. See note 35 supra.
The Fifth Circuit did follow the Second Circuit's determination that, despite
its wording, §2038 applied only to property interests that the decedent created. 511
F.2d at 264 n.11.
' 398 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975).
Id. at 824, 827.
"

7

Id. at 828.

, Id. at 822.
" See note 31 supra.
Compare Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958), quoted in note 5 supra,with H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942), quoted in note 31 supra.
,' 398 F. Supp. at 822, 828.

7 United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Lober v. United States, 346
U.S. 335 (1953). See note 51 supra.
7' The district court noted that O'Malley and Lober concerned a decedent's power
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Commissioner also argued that failure to tax Connelly's interest in
the policy, given congressional intent to tax the transfer of life insurance proceeds in a manner roughly parallel to other property, would
lead to an anomalous result. Noting that many provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are anomalous, the court declined to
accord this argument any weight.79 Moreover, even if Congress did
intend to establish parallel tax treatment, the district court found
that the analogy between §2042 and §§2036 and 2038 suggested by
the Commissioner was faulty. A more apt analogy could be drawn
between the employment insurance benefits in Connelly and qualified employment annuities which §2039(c) 81 of the Code excludes
from a decedent's gross estate. While the benefits in Connelly were
insurance and not annuity payments, in substance the two were
closely analogous.' Under both qualified §2039(c) annuities and the
policy in Connelly, the decedent's employer and not the decedent
paid for the benefits. In addition, the actual transfer of the benefits
in Connelly did not occur in a lump sum as with many other insurance policies, but rather as periodic payments similar to an annuity."
The district court, therefore, concluded that since the more accurate
analogy was to §2039(c) arrangements that excluded benefits from a
decedent's gross estate, the insurance proceeds in Connelly should
also be excluded from the decedent's estate.
Three days after Connelly, in Terriberry v. United States, the
Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its position. Although prohibited by the
terms of the trust instrument from exercising any incidents of ownership, the trustee decedent in Terriberry.was empowered to elect a
settlement option which permitted him to pay out as annuities the
value of life insurance policies held in the trust. Relying on Lumpkin
and Rose, the court of appeals held that the power to elect the settlement option, despite the prohibition against exercising any incidents
to terminate the trust or to shift benefits from one beneficiary to another. These powers
paralleled the powers listed in Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958) to cancel the policies
or to change the policy beneficiary. The court found that neither O'Malley nor Lober
extended beyond "the explicitly parallel language" to reach interests such as the
decedent possessed in Lumpkin and in Connelly. 398 F. Supp. at 825.
I!d.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2039(c).
398 F. Supp. at 826.
82 Id.
517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'g 34 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 147,927 (M.D. Fla.
1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3529 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976) (No. 865). The decision of
the district court is discussed in Life Insurance Proceeds Under § 2042, Survey of 1974
FederalEstate and Gift Tax Developments, 32 WASH. & Lee L. Rev. 1059, 1060 (1975).
"'
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of ownership, was a power to affect the time and manner of enjoyment
of the policies requiring their inclusion in the decedent's gross estate
under §2042.4 Over a strong dissent," the Fifth Circuit found that the
settlor's absolute power to remove the decedent as trustee or to revoke
the trust did not require a different result. Since the settlor's power
was unexercised at decedent's death, the decedent still possessed the
ability to exercise the settlement option.
Connelly, Skifter, and Fruehauf not only are incompatible with
Lumpkin, Rose, and Terriberry,but the former decisions are not even
consistent with each other. The cause of this conflict is §2042 and its
legislative history,8 both of which are silent on the question of
whether the interests involved in these six cases are to be considered
incidents of ownership. In the cases discussed, only the district court
in Connelly considered the pre-1942 history of incidents of ownership.
This history, it is suggested, may assist in resolving the issue.
The proceeds of life insurance policies were first subjected to the
federal estate tax by §402(f) of the Revenue Act of 1918.7 That Act
included in the gross estate of the insured "insurance under policies
taken out by the decedent upon his own life." 8 Although this phrase
was re-enacted without change four times 9 prior to the Revenue Act
of 1942, inconsistent court and Treasury constructions led one commentator in 1941 to summarize the history of the section as "twentytwo years of confusion."" ° The simplistic and ambiguous language of
the operative phrase "policies taken out by the decedent" produced
great uncertainty.
Originally, the Treasury interpreted "taken out by the decedent"
to represent Congress' intent to include only the proceeds of insurance policies on which the decedent had paid the premiums." In the
"

517 F.2d at 289.

Id. at 290 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
" See notes 87-121 infra and accompanying text.
" Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §402(f), 40 Stat. 1098.
"Id.
The Act also reached insurance proceeds paid to the executor, much as under
the current Code §2042(1). Insurance policies payable to beneficiaries other than the
executor were given a $40,000 exemption. Id.
"I Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §402(f), 42 Stat. 279; Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, §302(g), 43 Stat. 305; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §302(g), 44 Stat. 71; Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 3, §811(g), 53 Stat. 122.
9' Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance:A Suggested Solution to the Uncertain Cost
of Dying, 55 HARv. L. REV. 226, 227, (1941). This article contains a helpful discussion
of the changes in the Treasury's estate taxation approach to life insurance during the
1930's and early 1940's. See also Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 52
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1939).
" Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 32 (1919).
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1929 case of Chase National Bank v. United States,92 however, the
Supreme Court introduced the concept of retention of incidents of
ownership as a justification for taxing life insurance proceeds. In
Chase, the Court was presented with the argument 3 that including
the proceeds of life insurance policies payable to beneficiaries other
than the decedent's estate was constitutionally void as an unapportioned direct tax on property. 4 Holding the tax constitutional, the
Court noted that the statute taxed transfers of property, not the
property itself, and that the termination by death of the decedent's
power to change beneficiaries was a proper subject for a transfer tax. 5
The Court then reviewed the decedent's other "legal incidents of
ownership,"96 and held that the termination of the decedent's ability
to exercise his ownership effected a transfer of property no less within
the taxing power of Congress than were other transfers that occur at
death. 7
Chasewas primarily concerned with the constitutionality of estate
taxation of insurance policies and only secondarily considered statutory interpretation. The Treasury, however, apparently took advantage of the decision by introducing in its regulations the retention of
legal incidents of ownership as a test of when life insurance policies
would be deemed to have been "taken out" by the decedent. Closely
following the language of the Chase decision, 8 the Treasury listed as
legal incidents of ownership:
a power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the
policies, to assign them, to revoke an assignment of them, to
92 278

U.S. 327 (1929).

,3Id. at 334.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, §9. No truly satisfactory definition of a direct tax has ever
been suggested. Even the framers of the Constitution were puzzled. See the following

extract from

DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787

As REPORTED BY JAMES

reprintedin THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE GREAT DOCUMENTS,
1774-1789, at 580 (C. Tansill ed. 1972): "Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning
of direct taxation? No one answered."
'5 278 U.S. at 334.
" The Court stated, 278 U.S. at 335:
[a] power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies, to
pledge them as security for loans and the power to dispose of them and
their proceeds for his own benefit during his life which subjects them
to the control of a bankruptcy court for the benefit of his creditors...
and which may ... subject them in part to the payment of his debts
...is by no means the least substantial of the legal incidents of
MADISON,

ownership ....
"7Id. at 337.
91 See note 96 supra.
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pledge them for loans, or to dispose otherwise of them and their
proceeds for his own benefit, etc."
From 1929 until the Revenue Act of 1942, the Treasury Regulations vacillated between premium payments and incidents of ownership as tests for determining when insurance was "taken out" by the
decedent.'0 ' With the passage of the Revenue Act of 1942, Congress
finally modified the old estate tax treatment of insurance and provided for the inclusion of insurance proceeds in the decedent's gross
estate if he either paid the premiums for the policy or possessed'"' any
incidents of ownership in the policy. With minor change, Congress
adopted the concept of incidents of ownership as it had been developed in the Treasury Regulations which followed Chase. °2
Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, then, there had been
no major change in the concept of incidents of ownership introduced
in 1929. During that twenty-five year history, there was little discussion of whether the power to elect a settlement option like that in
Lumpkin and Connelly was an incident of ownership. The only case
to consider the issue was a 1937 Board of Tax Appeals decision"0 3
which held that the power to elect was not an incident of ownership.
Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 27 (1929).
' During this period the regulations made only one significant alteration in the

concept of incidents of ownership. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 25 (1934), changed the determination of taxability from retention of incidents of ownership by the decedent to possession of them at death. This change has been carried forward into the present Code,
§2042(2). See note 1 supra.
,02
See note 100 supra.
" See note 31 supra. But see Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716, 728 (1950),
aff'd sub nom. Selznick's Estate v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952) (per
curiam), where the Tax Court stated that the Revenue Act of 1942 worked a "fundamental change" in the concept of incidents of ownership; and Pedrick, Major Aspects
of Life Insurancein Estate Planning,27 TAXEs 1143, 1144 (1949), which characterized
the 1942 Act as a "complete departure from the past."
The Tax Court found that Congress made a "fundamental change" by eliminating
the requirement that the incidents of ownership be "legal." This change, however, is
not fundamental because most interests in life insurance policies are legal interests.
The change would not affect powers in the nature of incidents of ownership held solely
in a trustee capacity, as a trustee traditionally exercises only legal powers. See, e.g.,
G. BOGERT & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §146 (2d ed. 1965). Likewise,
the treatment of legal interests such as the settlement options in Lumpkin and
Connelly would not seem to be changed. In addition, the statement in Pedrick's article
is "too broad." 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §17.04
n.35 (1959). While the Act was a complete departure from the previous statute, it was
not a departure from previous case law concerning incidents of ownership. Id.
"1 May Billings, 35 B.T.A. 1147 (1937).

792

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

With the Commissioner's acquiesence in the case," 4 there was no
further consideration of the matter until acquiesence was withdrawn
during the litigation in the Lumpkin case in 1972.05 Chase, the paradigm for the development of incidents of ownership, provides no direct answer to whether the power to elect the settlement option is an
incident of ownership. That power, nevertheless, seems clearly to be
an interest of lesser magnitude than those which the Supreme Court
reviewed in Chase.'0' The pre-1954 Code history thus indicates that
the power to elect such settlement options was not considered to be
an incident of ownership. 07
Determining the pre-1954 Code status of incidents of ownership
held only in a trustee capacity is more difficult. As was largely true
of Lumpkin-type settlement options, the early case law is barren.
Beyond dispute, however, the powers that a trustee exercises are
similar to the taxable incidents of ownership.' The question is
whether Congress intended to tax the proceeds of life insurance policies to an insured's estate because he possessed powers equivalent to
incidents of ownership although the ownership could be exercised
only in a trustee capacity. The Supreme Court's decision in Chase
again supplies the answer. The focus of the Court's attention in Chase
was clearly on the decedent's power to exercise ownership "as completely as if he were himself the beneficiary,"'0 0 and a trustee lacks
this power." 0 When a trustee dies possessing powers in the nature of
incidents of ownership, he has not made a transfer such as those
"'

1937-2 CUM. BULL. 3.

1972-1 CUM. BULL. 3. See note 64 supra.
See note 96 supra.The Chase decision does contain language which can be read
to include Lumpkin's settlement option. See 278 U.S. at 338, where the Court states
that "so long as [the decedent] retains control over those benefits with power to direct
their future enjoyment until his death," an estate tax is proper. Lumpkin's settlement
option was arguably a power to direct the enjoyment of the insurance proceeds. Since
he failed to assign his ability to elect the settlement option, he did retain the power
until his death. To read Chase in this manner, however, would go beyond the Court's
concept of incidents of ownership. The control to direct the enjoyment of insurance
policies referred to by the Court was the "outstanding power" to "recall a gift after it
is made" by changing the beneficiary. 278 U.S. at 336. Lumpkin's settlement option
was not such an outstanding power. Furthermore, Lumpkin never possessed an "interest in the policies which gave him the power of disposition of them and their proceeds
as completely as if he were himself the beneficiary of them" Id. at 334.
"
But cf. note 102 supra.
Compare G. BOGERT & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §§551-66
(2d ed. 1965) with Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958), quoted in note 5 supra.
"
278 U.S. at 334.
11 See, e.g., G. BOGERT & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §146 (2d
ed. 1965).
"c
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considered in Chase, for at no time was he ever free to exercise ownership in any manner except to profit the beneficiary."' Unless Congress intended the 1954 Code to effect a marked expansion in the
concept of incidents of ownership, it would therefore seem that neither the decedent's possession of powers in the nature of incidents of
ownership solely in a trustee capacity, nor his power to elect a
Lumpkin-type settlement option, is an incident of ownership that
would cause the proceeds to be taxed.
The Second Circuit,"2 however, found that Congress in effect expanded the definition of incidents of ownership by adding to the
historical concept of incidents of ownership"' an intent to make the
estate tax treatment of insurance roughly parallel to that accorded
other types of property. The Fifth Circuit"' adopted this view in
Lumpkin, Rose, and Terriberry.Those decisions rest upon the validity of the Second Circuit's view, for if Congress in 1954 did not so
expand the concept of incidents of ownership, the pre-1954 Code
history would indicate that those cases were wrongly decided.
There are a number of reasons for disagreeing with the "rough
parallel" analysis. The inference that the Second Circuit drew from
the committee reports describing the decision to eliminate the premium payments test"' seems to rest upon a weak base. When Congress
decided to expand the concept of incidents of ownership by including
reversionary interests, it made specific provision for this in §2042.11,
There is no apparent reason, and the Second Circuit's discussion
supplied none, why Congress could not also have provided in the
statute for the expansion of incidents of ownership that the rough
parallel analysis entails."7 More likely, Congress instead intended
only to end the perceived discrimination against life insurance that
resulted from the premium payments test. In addition, the support
that the Second Circuit found in the codification of a five per cent
reversionary interest as an incident of ownership"' seems misplaced.
Congress in 1954 rejected an amendment to §2042 that would have
made the tax treatment of reversionary interests in insurance policies
more like the treatment of other reversionary interests under §2037"
Id.
See text accompanying notes 27-53 supra.
"
See notes 92-102 and accompanying text supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 54-69 & 83-85 supra.
,15See text accompanying note 40 supra.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2042(2). See note 1 supra.
I'
,, See note 20, 42-43 & 45 supra.
"' See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
Proposed Amendments to H.R. 8300, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pre"I

"'
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than that which was finally adopted.10 This action seems unusual if
Congress actually intended to establish parallel tax treatment. Furthermore, Congress refused to accord §2042 transfers the advantages
that §2043 gives to transfers for insufficient consideration.'"' Property
transfers under §§2035-38 and §2041, however, were given this beneficial treatment. This, too, seems unusual if parallel tax treatment
2
were intended. 1
Thus, contrary to the reasoning of the Fifth and Second Circuits,
it is apparent that Congress did not intend the 1954 Code to give life
insurance policies tax treatment parallel to that of other types of
property under the Code. Life insurance was to be included in the
gross estate under §2042'2 basically as it had been under the predecessors to §2042, with reference to the possession of incidents of ownsented to Senate Finance Committee on Behalf of the Life Insurance Companies by
the American Life Convention and the Life Insurance Association of America, April
23, 1954, Hearingson H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 192, 206-07 (1954).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2042(2). See note 1 supra.
121 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2043(a) provides that :
[ilf any one of the transfers, trusts, interests, rights, or powers enumerated and described in sections 2035 to 2038, inclusive, and section
2041 is made, created, exercised, or relinquished for a consideration
in money or money's worth, but is not a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, there shall be included in the gross estate only the excess of the fair market value at
the time of death of the property otherwise to be included on account
of such transaction, over the value of the consideration received therefor by the decedent.
'
The distinction that the Fifth Circuit drew between the taxation in §2042 of
interests that the decedent possessed and the emphasis in § §2036 and 2038 on retained
interests, see text accompanying notes 64 & 69 supra, is undercut when it is recognized
that the 1934 Treasury Regulations first employed the term "possession" in lieu of
retention. See note 100 supra. Congress in 1954 probably intended the use of the word
"possessed" to continue to have the same connotation as it had had for twenty years
before the 1954 Code. It seems unlikely that Congress intended to employ the "conspicuous variety in statutory idiom" perceived by the Fifth Circuit in Rose v. United
States, 511 F.2d at 265. See also 55 B.U.L. REV. 864, 870 (1975). Even if the parallel
analysis is accepted, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rose was "unsupported by precedent." Id. at 873.
'21 The interpretation of incidents of ownership suggested here is not reconcilable
with Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(4) (1958), quoted in note 35 supra.In reference to Reg.
§20.2042-1(c)(4), see D. KAHN & E. Colson, Federal Taxation of Estates, Gifts, and
Trusts 111.801, at 102 (2d ed. 1975), which states that the validity of Reg. 20.2042l(c)(4) is "very much in doubt." The Treasury may have been misled by the same
problems as the Fifth Circuit. But cf. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550
(1973) (Treasury regulations will be upheld if a reasonable implementation of congressional intent).
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ership, and without regard to how other types of property were
treated under other Code sections. Thus, the status of the decedent
as transferor or transferee of an interest in an insurance policy is
immaterial.' 4 Whether the interest constitutes a tax-triggering incident should still be determined, as before the 1954 Code, without
regard to how the decedent acquired the interest.
Connelly best reflects the history of §2042 by considering the development of the concept of incidents of ownership before as well as
after the Revenue Act of 1942. The district court correctly concluded
that neither Lumpkin-type settlement options nor managerial control
of insurance policies exercised solely in a trustee capacity should be
taxed as incidents of ownership. Until either Congress or the Supreme
Court directly considers the tax treatment of such interests, however,
reliance on any analysis of their tax status must be considered uncertain at best. With the rapid development of an opposite viewpoint on
this aspect of estate tax law by the Fifth Circuit, the Second and
Sixth Circuit decisions may be subject to challenge. Thus, regardless
of whether one lives in the Second, Fifth, or Sixth Circuits, or even
in New Jersey where Connelly spreads a protective wing, prudent
estate planning continues to dictate a most cautious approach to life
insurance.
WILLIAM R. BALDWIN, I
,' While the status of the decedent as transferor or transferee would be immaterial
for purposes of the taxation of insurance policies under §2042, it might be determinative with regard to the taxation of insurance policies under other estate tax sections.
See note 2 supra.

